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The license or notification issued in accordance with

section 1715 continues to carry the same value as a

license or notification under the Public Health Code,

until a new license is obtained under the Public Health

Code or, failing which, for a maximum period of five

years, in other words no later than 4th September 2019.

In accordance with Article L. 593-3 of the Environment

Code, a facility located within the perimeter of a BNI,

recorded in a section of the ICPE list but necessary for

operation of the BNI, is subject to the BNI system.

By virtue of Article L.1333-9of the PublicHealthCode, the

licences issued to ICPEs inaccordancewith theEnvironment

Code for the possession or use of radioactive sources,

take the place of the licences required under the Public

HealthCode.However, except for theprovisions concerning

procedures, the legislative and regulatory provisions of

the Public Health Code apply to them.

5.3 The regulatory framework

for protection against malicious acts

in nuclear activities

Malicious acts include theft ormisappropriation of nuclear

materials, acts of sabotage and attacks from outside

the BNIs. These last two points must be considered in

the procedures subject to the Environment Code and

regulated and monitored by ASN. In this respect, in

its safety analysis report, the licensee must present an

assessment of the accidents liable to occur in the facility,

regardless of the cause of the accident, including if it

results from a malicious act. This assessment, which

mentions the effects of accidents and the steps taken

to prevent them or mitigate their effects, is taken into

account when determining whether or not the creation

authorisation can be granted. The most important risk

prevention or mitigationmeasures can be the subject of

ASN requirements.

However, ASN is not responsible for either determining

the malicious threats to be considered, nor for regulating

andmonitoring the physical protectionof nuclear facilities

againstmalicious acts. The threats to be consideredwhen

examiningmalicious acts are defined by theGovernment

(General Secretariat for Defence and National Security

– SGDSN).

With regard to protection against malicious acts, two

arrangements instituted by the Defence Code apply to

certain nuclear activities:

Chapter III of Title III of Book III of the first part of

the Defence Code defines the measures to protect and

monitor nuclearmaterials. This concerns the following

fusible, fissile or fertilematerials: plutonium, uranium,

thorium,deuterium,tritium,lithium-6,aswellaschemical

compoundscomprisingoneoftheseelements,exceptores.

To prevent the dissemination of these nuclearmaterials,

their import, export, production, possession, transfer,

use and transport are subject to licensing.

Chapter II of Title III of Book III of the first part of

the Defence Code defines a system for protection of

establishmentswhich

“ifunavailable,wouldrisksignificantly

compromising the nation’s combat or economic potential, its

securityoritscapacityforsurvival”.

TheTSNActof13thJune

2006 supplemented Article L. 1332-2 of the Defence

Code in order to enable the administrative authority to

apply this system to facilities comprising a BNI

“when

the destruction of or damage to (this BNI) could constitute a

serious danger for the population”.

This protection system

requires that the licensees take the protectivemeasures

stipulated in a particular protection plan prepared by

themandapprovedby the administrative authority. These

measures in particular include effective surveillance,

alarmandmaterial protectionmeasures. If the plan is not

approved and in the event of persistent disagreement,

the decision is taken by the administrative authority.

With regard tonuclear activities outside the scopeof national

defence, these systems aremonitored at the national level

by the Defence and Security High Official (HFDS) at the

Ministry responsible for Energy.

Within a jointworking group, ASNandHFDShold regular

discussions about the accidents included in the safety

analysis reports as well as how some of them could be

the result of a malicious act or an act of terrorism. In this

respect, analysis of accident occurrences and the steps taken

to prevent them ensure that the regulation authorisation

processes carried out pursuant to the Defence Code are

consistentwith those resulting fromtheEnvironmentCode.

For radioactive sourceswhich are not nuclearmaterials as

specified above andwhich are not used in facilities subject

to the protectionobligations specified in theDefenceCode,

there are at present no arrangements for monitoring the

steps taken by those in possession of these sources to

prevent anymalicious acts. Yet, such acts involving some

of these sources could have serious consequences. This is

why, in 2008, the Government adopted the principle of

obligations to take preventivemeasures applicable to the

holders, with implementation thereof being monitored

by ASN. Legislative measures were therefore included in

the TECV Act and Ordinance 2016-128 (see chapter 10,

point 4.6).

5.4 The particular system for

defence-related nuclear activities

and installations

Theprovisions concerningdefence-relatednuclear facilities

and activitieswere codified in theDefenceCode (creation

of a sub-section2 entitled

“Defence-related nuclear facilities

and activities”

in Chapter III of Title II of Book III of the

first part of the legislative part) byOrdinance 2014-792 of

10th July 2014 implementingArticle 55of Act 2013-1168

124

CHAPTER 03:

REGULATIONS

ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015