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European harmonisation of safety and radiation protection
remains a priority for ASN, which will continue to
participate actively in the work of ENSREG (European
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group), a consultative body of
the European Commission in the field of nuclear safety,
and of WENRA (Western European Nuclear Regulators
Association) and HERCA (Heads of the European
Radiological protection Competent Authorities). The
ASN Chairman was in fact the President of ENSREG
in 2015.
ASN will in particular support projects to harmonise
the management of emergency situations in Europe,
more specifically with regard to the coordination of the
population and environment protection measures to be
taken by the various countries concerned by releases
in the event of a severe nuclear accident.
The possible continued operation
of ageing installations is a major issue
EDF wishes to extend the operating life of its reactors
currently in service well beyond forty years, the service
life posited at their initial design stage. In the future, this
fleet would function alongside new EPR or equivalent
type reactors, meeting considerably strengthened safety
requirements. The continued operation of the current
reactors beyond forty years must therefore be examined
taking account of the existence of safer technology. There
are then two objectives. The licensee must first of all
demonstrate the compliance of the reactors with the
applicable regulations, more specifically by analysing
and processing the problems of equipment ageing and
obsolescence. It must also improve their level of safety
with respect to the requirements applicable to the new
reactors.
On this point, ASN issued a position statement in 2013
on the list of topics to be examined more closely and
the generic studies to be carried out in the run-up to
the fourth periodic safety reviews for the 900 MWe
reactors. In early 2016, it should give its opinion on
the orientations adopted by EDF for the study and
verification programmes associated with these reviews.
Tricastin reactor 1 will be the first in France to
undergo its fourth ten-yearly in-service inspection,
in 2019. This time-frame is particularly tight, given
the scale of the analyses and work required. It raises
numerous questions: EDF’s ability to carry out the
necessary studies, industrial capacity for performing
the corresponding work, the ability of ASN and IRSN
to mobilise the human resources needed to analyse
the proposals and then check performance of the
programme decided on.
ASN intends to issue a generic opinion in 2018 on the
continued operation of the 900 MWe reactors beyond
forty years. This general opinion will be drafted with
the participation of the public. The subsequent periodic
review of each reactor will entail a public inquiry as
specified by the Energy Transition for Green Growth
Act (TECV).
Installations other than power reactors (laboratories, waste
plants and installations undergoing decommissioning)
cover a wide variety of activities: research, fuel cycle,
waste management, production of radiopharmaceuticals
and industrial irradiators, etc. These installations are
often ageing.
Several dozen of these installations will have to undergo
a periodic review, often for the first time. For both ASN
and IRSN, this already means a considerable increase in
the workload, which will only get heavier in the coming
years. Increased oversight, on a recently formalised basis,
that is proportionate to the safety issues, will be a means
of optimising how ASN and IRSN resources are used.
In any case, ASNwill ensure that the upgrades specified
further to these reviews are actually carried out, despite
the economic, financial and budget constraints faced
by the licensees.
The post-Fukushima Daiichi fixed
equipment must be deployed
Learning the lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi
accident has been an ASN priority since 2011. ASN
issued prescriptions aimed at significantly reinforcing
the safety of all the nuclear installations and it monitors
their implementation. ASN in particular prescribed
the deployment in each installation of a “hardened
safety core” of material and organisational provisions
which, in extreme conditions such as those which
led to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, would prevent
a severe accident and, were it nonetheless to occur,
would mitigate its consequences.
This “hardened safety core” comprises mobile equipment
that can be connected to the installation in addition
to fixed equipment, thus combining the advantages
of the immediate availability of fixed equipment with
the operational flexibility of mobile equipment. At
the international level, numerous countries simply
deployed mobile equipment. This mobile equipment
has been fully deployed in France as in most other
European countries. Deployment of the fixed equipment
is more complex and will take longer.
Changing pressure equipment regulations
The Order of 12 December 2005 modified the
regulations applicable to the manufacture of Nuclear
Pressure Equipment (ESPN), mainly by reinforcing
the substantiating documents required from the
manufacturers concerning the quality of their products
and by organising the intervention by approved technical
inspection agencies.
More specifically owing to the extended substantiations
it requires, this regulatory approach in particular enabled
EDITORIAL BY THE COMMISSION
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ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015