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in the discharge licenses, to requiring surveillance of
exposure in the working environment in order to reduce
it to the strict minimum and to ensuring that medical
exposure as a result of diagnostic procedures remains
close to the pre-determined reference levels.
1.1.7 The principle of limitation
The principle of limitation, defined in Article L. 1333-2
of the Public Health Code, states that:
“Exposure of an
individual to ionising radiation […] may not increase the
sumof the doses received beyond the limits set by regulations,
except when the individual is exposed formedical or biomedical
research purposes”.
The exposure of the general public or ofworkers as a result
of nuclear activities is subject to strict limits. These limits
include significant safetymargins toprevent deterministic
effects fromappearing, aswell as aiming at reducing to the
lowest level possible the appearance of probabilistic effects
in the long term.
Exceeding these limits leads to an abnormal situation
and one which may give rise to administrative or legal
sanction.
In the case of medical exposure of patients, no strict dose
limit is set, provided that this voluntary exposure is justified
by the expected health benefits to the person exposed.
1.1.8 The principle of prevention
To anticipate any environmental damage, the principle of
prevention, defined inArticle3of theEnvironmentCharter,
stipulates the implementationof rules andmeasureswhich
must take account of
“the best available technology at an
economically acceptable cost”.
In the nuclear field, this principle underlies the concept
of defence in depth, presented below.
1.2 Some aspects of the safety
approach
The safety principles and approaches presented below
were gradually implemented and incorporate experience
feedback from accidents. Absolute safety can never
be guaranteed and despite all the precautions taken
in the design, construction and operation of nuclear
facilities, an accident can never be completely ruled
out. The willingness to move forward and to create a
continuous improvement approach is thus essential if
the risks are to be reduced.
1.2.1 Safety culture
Safety culture is definedby the InternationalNuclear Safety
AdvisoryGroup (INSAG), an international nuclear safety
consultative group reporting to the General Director of
IAEA, as:
“that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in
organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an
overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the
attention warranted by their significance”.
Safety culture therefore determines the ways inwhich an
organisation and individuals perform their duties and
accept responsibility, with safety in mind. It is one of the
key fundamentals inmaintaining and improving safety. It
commits organisations and individuals topayingparticular
and appropriate attention to safety. At the individual level
it is given expression by a rigorous and cautious approach
and a questioning attitudemaking it possible to bothobey
rules and take initiative. In operational terms, the concept
underpins daily decisions and actions relating to activities.
The fundamental safety principles
IAEA establishes the following 10 principles
in its publication “SF-1”:
1. Responsibility for safety must rest with the person or
organisation responsible for facilities and activities that
give rise to radiation risks.
2. An effective legal and governmental framework for safety,
including an independent regulatory body, must
be established and sustained.
3. Effective leadership and management of safety must be
established and maintained in organisations concerned
with radiological risks, and in facilities and activities that
give rise to such risks.
4. Facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks must
yield an overall benefit.
5. Protection must be optimised to provide the highest level
of safety that can reasonably be achieved.
6. Measures for controlling radiation risks must ensure
that no individual bears an unacceptable risk of harm.
7. People and the environment, both present and future,
must be protected against radiation risks.
8. All practical efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate
nuclear or radiation accidents.
9. Arrangements must be made for emergency preparedness
and response for nuclear or radiation incidents.
10. Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated
radiation risks must be justified and optimised.
UNDERSTAND
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CHAPTER 02:
PRINCIPLES AND STAKEHOLDERS IN THE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015