Given the large numbers of those who could possibly
issue an alert and the corresponding alert circuits, all
the alerts are centralised in a single location, which then
distributes them to the parties concerned: this is the fire
brigade’s centralised alert processing centre CODIS-CTA
(Departmental Fire and Emergency Operations Centre
– Alert Processing Centre), that can be reached by calling
18 or 112.
1.1.4 Role of ASN in the preparation and follow-up
of emergency plans
Examination of emergency plans for nuclear
facilities or activities
ASN reviews the On-site Emergency Plans as part of the
procedure to authorise the commissioning of BNIs or the
possession and utilisation of high-level sealed sources
(Article R.1333-33 of the Public Health Code), as well
as themanagement plans for events linked to radioactive
substances transports.
Participation in drafting the Off-site
Emergency Plans
Pursuant to the 13th September 2005Decrees concerning
the PPI and the Orsec plan, the Prefect is responsible
for preparing and approving the PPI. ASN provides
assistance by analysing the technical data to be provided
by the licensees, in particular the nature and scope of
the consequences of an accident, with the help of its
technical support organisation, IRSN.
Contingency Plans, such as the PPI, identify the general
public protectionmeasures such as tomitigate the health
and environmental consequences of any accident. The
Prefect decides whether or not to deploy these measures
on the basis of the predicted dose that would be received
by a one year old child situated in the open air at the
time of the accident.
The intervention levels associatedwith the implementation
of general public protection measures in a radiological
emergency situation, mentioned in Article R.1333-80
of the Public Health Code, are thus defined by ASN
resolution 2009-DC-0153 of 18th August 2009:
•
an effective dose of 10millisieverts (mSv) for sheltering;
•
an effective dose of 50 mSv for evacuation;
•
an equivalent dose to the thyroid of 50 mSv for the
administration of stable iodine.
The predicted doses are those that it is assumed will be
received until releases into the environment are brought
under control, generally calculated over a period of
24 hours. In the event of doubt concerning the duration
of the releases, the time adopted for the calculation does
not exceed one week.
The Fukushima Daiichi accident showed that a severe
accident canhave consequences that affect a radius of several
tens of kilometres around anNPP. InFrance, PPI planning
makes provision for civil protection of the population
residingwithin a 10kmradius around the affected reactor
in the initial hours of the accident. The effectiveness of
this organisation thus requires the preparation and, as
applicable, the implementation of measures beyond the
PPI perimeter as part of theORSECplanning process. ASN
considers that it is today essential to continue with the
harmonisation effort so that concrete results are achieved
to ensure consistent populationprotectionmeasures across
Europe following an accident. Such an accident occurring
in a European countrywouldmost probably affect several
countries, thus strengthening the need for coordination
between these countries (see points 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).
ASN also assists the Ministry of the Interior’s General
Directorate forCivil Security andEmergencyManagement
(DGSCGC) with a view to supplementing the PPIs
concerning aspects relating topost-accidentmanagement
(see point 1.5).
1.2 Controlling urban development
around nuclear sites
The aimof controlling urban development is to limit the
consequences of a severe accident for the population and
property. Since 1987, this type of approach has been
implemented around non-nuclear industrial facilities
and it has been reinforced since the AZF facility accident
that occurred in Toulouse (South of France) in 2001. The
TSNAct, nowcodified inBooks I andVof the Environment
Code, enables the public authorities to control urban
development around BNIs, by implementing institutional
controls limiting or prohibiting new constructions in the
vicinity of these facilities.
The actions to control urban development entail a division
of responsibilities between the licensee, the mayors and
the State:
•
The licensee is responsible for its activities and the
related risks.
•
Themayor is responsible for producing the townplanning
documents and issuing building permits.
•
ThePrefect informs themayors of the existing risks, verifies
the legality of the steps takenby the local authorities and
may impose institutional controls as necessary.
•
ASNsupplies technical data in order to characterise the
risk, and offers the Prefect its assistance in the urban
development control process.
In recent years, urban development pressure in the vicinity
of nuclear sites has increased. It is therefore important to
incorporate the control of urban development into the
management of the nuclear risk. ASN’s current doctrine
for controlling activities around nuclear facilities only
166
CHAPTER 05:
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY AND POST-ACCIDENT SITUATIONS
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015




