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Given the large numbers of those who could possibly

issue an alert and the corresponding alert circuits, all

the alerts are centralised in a single location, which then

distributes them to the parties concerned: this is the fire

brigade’s centralised alert processing centre CODIS-CTA

(Departmental Fire and Emergency Operations Centre

– Alert Processing Centre), that can be reached by calling

18 or 112.

1.1.4 Role of ASN in the preparation and follow-up

of emergency plans

Examination of emergency plans for nuclear

facilities or activities

ASN reviews the On-site Emergency Plans as part of the

procedure to authorise the commissioning of BNIs or the

possession and utilisation of high-level sealed sources

(Article R.1333-33 of the Public Health Code), as well

as themanagement plans for events linked to radioactive

substances transports.

Participation in drafting the Off-site

Emergency Plans

Pursuant to the 13th September 2005Decrees concerning

the PPI and the Orsec plan, the Prefect is responsible

for preparing and approving the PPI. ASN provides

assistance by analysing the technical data to be provided

by the licensees, in particular the nature and scope of

the consequences of an accident, with the help of its

technical support organisation, IRSN.

Contingency Plans, such as the PPI, identify the general

public protectionmeasures such as tomitigate the health

and environmental consequences of any accident. The

Prefect decides whether or not to deploy these measures

on the basis of the predicted dose that would be received

by a one year old child situated in the open air at the

time of the accident.

The intervention levels associatedwith the implementation

of general public protection measures in a radiological

emergency situation, mentioned in Article R.1333-80

of the Public Health Code, are thus defined by ASN

resolution 2009-DC-0153 of 18th August 2009:

an effective dose of 10millisieverts (mSv) for sheltering;

an effective dose of 50 mSv for evacuation;

an equivalent dose to the thyroid of 50 mSv for the

administration of stable iodine.

The predicted doses are those that it is assumed will be

received until releases into the environment are brought

under control, generally calculated over a period of

24 hours. In the event of doubt concerning the duration

of the releases, the time adopted for the calculation does

not exceed one week.

The Fukushima Daiichi accident showed that a severe

accident canhave consequences that affect a radius of several

tens of kilometres around anNPP. InFrance, PPI planning

makes provision for civil protection of the population

residingwithin a 10kmradius around the affected reactor

in the initial hours of the accident. The effectiveness of

this organisation thus requires the preparation and, as

applicable, the implementation of measures beyond the

PPI perimeter as part of theORSECplanning process. ASN

considers that it is today essential to continue with the

harmonisation effort so that concrete results are achieved

to ensure consistent populationprotectionmeasures across

Europe following an accident. Such an accident occurring

in a European countrywouldmost probably affect several

countries, thus strengthening the need for coordination

between these countries (see points 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).

ASN also assists the Ministry of the Interior’s General

Directorate forCivil Security andEmergencyManagement

(DGSCGC) with a view to supplementing the PPIs

concerning aspects relating topost-accidentmanagement

(see point 1.5).

1.2 Controlling urban development

around nuclear sites

The aimof controlling urban development is to limit the

consequences of a severe accident for the population and

property. Since 1987, this type of approach has been

implemented around non-nuclear industrial facilities

and it has been reinforced since the AZF facility accident

that occurred in Toulouse (South of France) in 2001. The

TSNAct, nowcodified inBooks I andVof the Environment

Code, enables the public authorities to control urban

development around BNIs, by implementing institutional

controls limiting or prohibiting new constructions in the

vicinity of these facilities.

The actions to control urban development entail a division

of responsibilities between the licensee, the mayors and

the State:

The licensee is responsible for its activities and the

related risks.

Themayor is responsible for producing the townplanning

documents and issuing building permits.

ThePrefect informs themayors of the existing risks, verifies

the legality of the steps takenby the local authorities and

may impose institutional controls as necessary.

ASNsupplies technical data in order to characterise the

risk, and offers the Prefect its assistance in the urban

development control process.

In recent years, urban development pressure in the vicinity

of nuclear sites has increased. It is therefore important to

incorporate the control of urban development into the

management of the nuclear risk. ASN’s current doctrine

for controlling activities around nuclear facilities only

166

CHAPTER 05:

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY AND POST-ACCIDENT SITUATIONS

ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015