167 / 536
concerns those facilities requiring a PPI and primarily aims
to avoid compromising the feasibility of the sheltering
and evacuation measures. It focuses on the “reflex”
zones of the PPIs, or the rapid-development hazard
zones, established in accordance with the Circular of
10th March 2000 and in which automatic measures to
protect the general public are taken in the event of a
rapidly developing accident.
ACircular from the Ministry for the Environment dated
17th February 2010 has asked the Prefects to exercise
greater vigilance over urban development near nuclear
installations. This Circular states that the greatest possible
attentionmust be paid to projects that are sensitive owing
to their size, their purpose, or the difficulties they could
entail in terms of protection of the general public in
the so-called «reflex» zone. A pluralistic working group
jointly overseen by ASN and the General Directorate for
Risk Prevention (DGPR), comprising elected officials
and the National Association of Local Information
Commissions and Committees (Anccli), drafted a guide
in 2011 concerning the control of activities around BNIs,
based on the following principles:
•
to preserve the operability of the contingency plans;
•
to favour urban development outside the rapid-
development hazard zone;
•
to allow controlled development that meets the needs
of the resident population.
This draft guide was the subject of an extensive public
consultation on thewebsites of theMinistry responsible for
the Environment and of ASN, which led to the introduction
of institutional controls, so that the principles of the
control of activities are incorporated into landuse planning
documents. This guide is scheduled for publication in the
first half of 2016, in order to make public the principles
underpinning ASN’s opinions. ASN is consulted for all
building projects within the PPI reflex response perimeters
(zones in which predetermined population protection
measures will be taken in the event of a rapidly developing
accident). The opinions issued may be reserved or even
unfavourable concerning projects considered to be
sensitive with regard to implementation of the population
protection measures included in the PPIs (sheltering,
evacuation, distribution of stable iodine tablets): dense
collective housing, shopping centres, schools, leisure
parks, retirement homes, kindergartens, etc.
1.3 Organising a collective response
The response by the public authorities to an incident or
accident is determined by a number of texts concerning
nuclear safety, radiationprotection, public order and civil
protection, as well as by the emergency plans.
Act 2004-811 of 13th August 2004 on the modernisation
of civil protection, makes provision for an updated
inventory of risks, an overhaul of operational planning,
performance of exercises involving the general public,
information and training of the general public, an
operational watching brief and alert procedures.
Several Decrees implementing this Act, codified in
Articles L 41-1 to L 741-32 of the Domestic Security
Code, more specifically concerning the ORSEC plans
and PPIs, clarified it in 2005.
The field of radiological emergency situations is clarified
in the Interministerial Directive of 7th April 2005, which
constitutes the basis for the organisations adopted by the
public authorities and the licensee presented in diagram1.
Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, considerable
thought was given nationally and internationally to
consolidating and, as applicable, improving the response
organisation of the public authorities. Indeed, this
accident showed that it was necessary to improve
preparation for the occurrence of a multi-faceted accident
(natural disaster, accident affecting several facilities
simultaneously). The response organisations thus put
into place must be robust and capable of managing a
large-scale emergency over a long period of time. There
must be greater anticipation of and preparation for
interventions in a degraded radiological situation along
with better international relations to enable effective
support to be provided to the country affected.
Thus, at the national level, ASN is actively involved in
interministerial work on nuclear emergencymanagement.
At the international level, ASN is taking part in the
experience feedback work being done by international
bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and
within regulatory authority networks such as theWestern
European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA)
or the Heads of the European Radiological protection
Competent Authorities (HERCA) (see point 2.2.2).
1.3.1 Local response organisation
Inanemergency situation, several parties have the authority
to take decisions
•
The licensee of the affected nuclear facilities deploys
the response organisation and the resources defined
in its PUI (see point 1.1.1).
•
One of ASN’s duties is tomonitor the licensee’s actions
in terms of nuclear safety and radiation protection. In
an emergency situation, aided by IRSN’s assessments, it
can at any time ask the licensee to performassessments
and take the necessary actions.
•
The Prefect of the
département
inwhich the installation
is located takes the necessary decisions to protect the
population, the environment and the property threatened
by the accident. He or she takes action according to the
PPI and theORSECplans. The Prefect is thus responsible
for coordinating the resources - both public and private,
human and material - deployed in the plan. He keeps
the population and the mayors informed of events.
Through its regional division, ASN assists the Prefect
in drafting the plans and managing the situation.
167
CHAPTER 05:
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY AND POST-ACCIDENT SITUATIONS
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015