258 / 536
SET Georges Besse II - Uranium enrichment plant in Pierrelatte
The Georges Besse II (GB II) plant operated by
Société
d’enrichissement du Tricastin
(SET), displayed a satisfactory
level of safety in 2015. The technologies deployed in the
plant enable high standards of safety, radiation protection
and environmental protection to be met.
The gradual entry into production of the enrichment
cascades was completed in 2015. The internal cascade
startup authorisation commission functioned satisfactorily.
After an inspection carried out by ASN in 2014 to examine
the criticality riskwhich gave unsatisfactory results, ASN
verified in 2015 that SET had takenmeasures to improve
control of the criticality risk.
ASN also authorised entry into service of the REC II unit
through ASN resolution 2014-DC-0461 of 7th October
2014. In 2015 it verified the conditions of entry into
service of this facility. Although the first operations of
the unit were carried out with rigour, ASN considers that
the operating reliability of the facilitymust be improved.
Socatri - Company operating
a clean-up and recovery installation - Bollène plant
ASN detected shortcomings in the management of the
operational safety of Socrati’s activities in 2015.
With regard to the commitments made by Socatri in
2014 following the periodic safety review of BNI 138,
ASN observed that the licensee had difficulties in
meeting the commitment deadlines and content, and
then in deploying them operationally, particularly the
commitments concerning control of the criticality risk.
ASN also detected several nonconformities of elements
classified as important for protection with respect to
the defined design requirements. Lastly, numerous
shortcomings in fire risk control were detected during
an unannounced inspection on this theme in 2015.
ASN therefore expects Socatri to demonstrate greater
operating rigour and improve the facility’s compliance
with its baseline safety requirements.
Installations undergoing decommissioning
Superphénix reactor at Creys-Malville
ASN considers that the safety of the Superphénix reactor
decommissioning operations and of operation of the
APEC (fuel storage facility) is ensured satisfactorily. The
progress ASNobserved in 2014with regard to operating
rigour andmonitoring the performance of maintenance
operations and periodic tests was maintained in 2015.
In 2015 ASN asked EDF to rapidly take organisational
measures to improve management of the retention
structures and in particular the treatment of hazardous
substances that could accumulate in them.
ASNwill shortlymake a statement on the treatment of the
residual sodium of the reactor vessel and its filling with
water. Preparation and performance of these operations
represent the main risk activities for the coming year.
The periodic safety review has started on the site’s two
installations. EDF must submit the conclusions to ASN
in March 2016. After examining them, ASN will adopt
a position on the conditions of its continued operation.
Bugey nuclear power plant reactor 1 undergoing decommissioning
ASN considers that the decommissioning of reactor 1 is
proceeding under generally satisfactory safety conditions
but that EDF must remain vigilant to the safety of the
workers performing the activities.
The decommissioning work outside the reactor vessel
continued in 2015.
CEA centre reactors and plants in Grenoble
Particularly notable in 2015 was the finalising of the
operations to clean-out and delicense the waste zoning
of the LAMA (activematerials analysis laboratory), which
took place in February. CEA submitted its delicensing
application file for the BNI in March 2015.
The technical discussions between ASN and the CEA
concerning the remediation of the soil of the STED (effluent
and waste treatment plant) continued. ASN asked the
CEA to continue the remediation operations that can be
technically achieved at a cost that remains acceptable.
The other industrial and research facilities
High Flux Reactor (RHF) in the Laue-Langevin Institute (ILL)
in Grenoble
ASN considers that the safety of the RHF is managed
in a responsive and determined manner in the areas
considered as priorities by ILL.
Thus, in response to the lessons learned fromtheFukushima
Daiichi accident, ILL rapidly introduced substantial
consolidation measures, which continued smoothly in
2015. ASN notes however that these improvements are
not always implemented with the rigour necessary to
ensure traceability of the activities and updating of the
baseline requirements.
Besides, the ILL must improve and clarify the baseline
safety requirements of the installation, then ensure that
the installation complies with this baseline.
LYON DIVISION
258
CHAPTER 08 :
REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015