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MARSEILLE DIVISION

the personnel under more satisfactory conditions. ASN

considers that the current organisation is robust.

ASN underlines that CEAmust continue its efforts in the

planning and performance of periodic inspections and

tests, themonitoringof outside contractors, the operational

control documentation for normal and accident situations,

and protection against the fire risk.

Management of the waste produced by the facilities and

management of on-site transport operations are judged

positively. Improvements are however expected in the

management of sealed radioactive sources, themanagement

of pressure equipment and the coordination of feedback

from significant events that could be of interest to several

of the centre’s BNIs.

Environmental issuesmust be given greater consideration

in themodification files submittedbyCEA. In this context,

ASN is continuing the revision -which it began in2014 - of

theprescriptions concerningwater intake andconsumption

and the discharge of liquid and gaseous effluents fromthe

centre’s BNIs inorder to integrate the lessons learned from

significant events notified by the licensee in recent years,

the planned entry into service of the groundwater drains

at the LEFCA and various modifications of installations

which have taken place since 2010.

ITER

ASN performed five inspections of ITER in 2015. It

notes significant efforts in project organisation and in the

embracingof the safetyculture since the start of construction.

ASNnevertheless remains vigilant regarding these subjects,

given the complex international organisationof the project

and the scalable design of the installation.

The year 2015 saworganisational changes in ITER following

the appointment of anewdirector general,more specifically

with the setting up of integrated project teams involving

the domestic agencies of seven countries or groups of

ITER member countries. Moreover, despite significant

delays, the installation constructionwork continuedwith

the building of the first level of the tokamak complex and

erection of the metallic framework of the assembly hall.

Manufacture of the equipment that will constitute the

installation has also progressed.

Further toan inspection inSouthKorea into themanufacture

of sectors of thevacuumchamber (seediagraminchapter 14,

page 451), ASN notes that the specified requirements

for this work package have been properly taken into

account. One inspection also concerned the supply of

drainage tanks by the US domestic agency when they

were delivered to the ITER site. Efforts must be made in

formalising and substantiating the inspections certifying

equipment conformity, in handling deviations and in

document archiving and accessibility.

The impact of the organisational changes has also been

examinedwith regard to the regulations applicable to the

monitoring of outside contractors, the domestic agencies

being the forefront of these organisational changes. Under

the auspices of a project teammade up of personnel of the

licensee and of the Europeandomestic agency, fabrication

of a drainage tank for level B2 of the tokamak complex

was started without complying with the organisation set

up by the licensee to satisfy safety requirements, resulting

in several belatedly detected failures. Improvementsmust

be made in the detection of deviations and in outside

contractors’ compliancewith the licensee’s requirements.

Marcoule platform

ASN has finalised seven resolutions relative to water

intake and consumption and the discharge of liquid

and gaseous effluents from Mélox, Centraco, Atalante

and Gammatec. The examination was carried out in

collaboration with the Defence Nuclear Safety Authority

(ASND) tasked with revising the discharge order for

the secret basic nuclear installation of Marcoule, in

accordance with a procedure aiming at stepping up

public information on the risks associated with the

impact of all the installations on the platform. ASN

is currently carrying out a similar examination of the

Phénix plant decommissioning.

Mélox plant

ASN carried out six inspections of the Mélox plant in

2015. ASN considers that the level of safety remains

satisfactory. The containment barriers remain effective

and robust. The radiation protection and criticality risks

are handled with rigour.

ASNnotes that the radiation protection studies prescribed

further to the 10-year periodic safety review of the

facility is bearing fruit and resulting in the optimisation

of certain work stations and the implementation of

additional radiological protections. On the other hand,

ASN notes delays in the prescribed work to improve

control of fire risks and in implementing the licensee’s

commitments regarding the monitoring of subcontracted

operations.

Deviations in the application of the regulatory provisions

for in-service monitoring of pressure equipment were

identified and corrected in 2015. The deviations consisted

in failing to apply the particular technical specifications

applicable to these items of equipment regarding the

performance of initial inspections, periodic controls,

requalification and the lack of in-service monitoring.

ASN expects improvements in the management of

pressure equipment, including better embracing of

the regulations applicable to these items and closer

monitoring of their servicing.

ASN also remains attentive to the examination of the

facility’s projects, particularly those concerning the

development of fuel for the Astrid project and the

transfer to Mélox of MOX rods stored in the FBFC

plant in Dessel, Belgium, as part of its decommissioning.

265

CHAPTER 08 :

REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION

ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015