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demand that the platform licensees

meet their responsibilities and either

complete the unification process

scheduled for 2012 or abandon the

pooling of the equipment that should

be in the possession of each of them.

Romans-sur-Isère site

ArevaNP still needs to carryoutmajor

conformityworkon several buildings.

Given the malfunctions observed

in recent years, ASN will pursue its

heightened surveillance of the facility

in 2016 in order to ensure that this

licensee’s nuclear safety performance

is improved. It will be attentive to

compliance with the deadlines for

performance of the work defined in

the facility’s safety improvement plan

and the revision of its safety baseline

requirements. It will also be attentive

to ensuring the implementation of

the improvements planned as part

of the stress tests.

Thereportspresentingtheconclusions

oftheten-yearlyperiodicsafetyreviews

conductedon the two installations on

the site, submitted at the endof 2014

for BNI 98 and at the end of 2015

for BNI 63, will be examined so that

ASN can reach a conclusion on the

conditions for the possible continued

operationof these installations for the

coming ten years.

La Hague site

ASN considers that efforts must be

continued concerning the recovery

and packaging of legacy waste from

the La Hague plants.

With regard to the recovery of legacy

waste,ASNwillbeattentivetoensuring

that any changes inAreva’s industrial

strategy do not lead to any failure to

comply with the ASN prescriptions

concerning the recovery and removal

of waste from silo 130 and the STE2

and HAO sludges. ASN had already

issued prescriptions to this effect in

2010 for silo 130 and in 2014 for the

entirewaste Recovery andPackaging

Programme (RCD). 2016will thus be

marked by ASN’s verification of the

licensee’simplementationoftheabove-

mentioned regulatory provisions.

The research and civil industrial BNIs

not directly linked to the generation

of electricity are operated by CEA,

by other research organisations (for

example the Institut Laue-Langevin–

ILL,theITERinternationalorganisation

and the Ganil) or by industry (for

exampleCISbiointernational,Synergy

Health and Ionisos, which operate

radiopharmaceutical production

facilities and industrial irradiators).

The safety principles applicable

to these facilities are identical to

those applied to power reactors and

nuclear fuel cycle facilities, while

taking account of their specificities

with regard to risks and detrimental

effects. To improve theway inwhich

these specific risks and detrimental

effects are taken into account and in

accordance with the resolution of

29th September 2015, ASN placed

the installations it regulates into three

categories.

Significant events

Withregard to thenuclear installations

operatedbyCEA, the generic subjects

whichmore specifically attracted the

attention of ASN in 2015 were:

monitoring of the periodic safety

reviews, in particular concerning

the integration of aspects common

to the BNIs on a given site and the

lessons learned fromrequirements

added during examination of the

CEA installations files with the

lowest risks;

wa s t e ma n a g e m e n t a n d

de commi s s i on i ng o f CEA

installations for which numerous

projects are significantly behind

schedule owing to changes in

strategy.

2015wasmarked by the requirement

for post-Fukushima Daiichi

“hardened safety cores” in certain

CEA centres and installations.

Their implementation will lead

to a significant improvement in

safety and will give CEA robust

14

Nuclear research and

miscellaneous industrial facilities

37

ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN 2015