demand that the platform licensees
meet their responsibilities and either
complete the unification process
scheduled for 2012 or abandon the
pooling of the equipment that should
be in the possession of each of them.
Romans-sur-Isère site
ArevaNP still needs to carryoutmajor
conformityworkon several buildings.
Given the malfunctions observed
in recent years, ASN will pursue its
heightened surveillance of the facility
in 2016 in order to ensure that this
licensee’s nuclear safety performance
is improved. It will be attentive to
compliance with the deadlines for
performance of the work defined in
the facility’s safety improvement plan
and the revision of its safety baseline
requirements. It will also be attentive
to ensuring the implementation of
the improvements planned as part
of the stress tests.
Thereportspresentingtheconclusions
oftheten-yearlyperiodicsafetyreviews
conductedon the two installations on
the site, submitted at the endof 2014
for BNI 98 and at the end of 2015
for BNI 63, will be examined so that
ASN can reach a conclusion on the
conditions for the possible continued
operationof these installations for the
coming ten years.
La Hague site
ASN considers that efforts must be
continued concerning the recovery
and packaging of legacy waste from
the La Hague plants.
With regard to the recovery of legacy
waste,ASNwillbeattentivetoensuring
that any changes inAreva’s industrial
strategy do not lead to any failure to
comply with the ASN prescriptions
concerning the recovery and removal
of waste from silo 130 and the STE2
and HAO sludges. ASN had already
issued prescriptions to this effect in
2010 for silo 130 and in 2014 for the
entirewaste Recovery andPackaging
Programme (RCD). 2016will thus be
marked by ASN’s verification of the
licensee’simplementationoftheabove-
mentioned regulatory provisions.
The research and civil industrial BNIs
not directly linked to the generation
of electricity are operated by CEA,
by other research organisations (for
example the Institut Laue-Langevin–
ILL,theITERinternationalorganisation
and the Ganil) or by industry (for
exampleCISbiointernational,Synergy
Health and Ionisos, which operate
radiopharmaceutical production
facilities and industrial irradiators).
The safety principles applicable
to these facilities are identical to
those applied to power reactors and
nuclear fuel cycle facilities, while
taking account of their specificities
with regard to risks and detrimental
effects. To improve theway inwhich
these specific risks and detrimental
effects are taken into account and in
accordance with the resolution of
29th September 2015, ASN placed
the installations it regulates into three
categories.
Significant events
Withregard to thenuclear installations
operatedbyCEA, the generic subjects
whichmore specifically attracted the
attention of ASN in 2015 were:
•
monitoring of the periodic safety
reviews, in particular concerning
the integration of aspects common
to the BNIs on a given site and the
lessons learned fromrequirements
added during examination of the
CEA installations files with the
lowest risks;
•
wa s t e ma n a g e m e n t a n d
de commi s s i on i ng o f CEA
installations for which numerous
projects are significantly behind
schedule owing to changes in
strategy.
2015wasmarked by the requirement
for post-Fukushima Daiichi
“hardened safety cores” in certain
CEA centres and installations.
Their implementation will lead
to a significant improvement in
safety and will give CEA robust
14
Nuclear research and
miscellaneous industrial facilities
37
ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN 2015




