ASN Report 2015

With regard tomaintenance, ASNnotes that the refuelling

outage of reactor 2 was satisfactory on the whole, but

work monitoring must be further improved in order to

prevent the maintenance quality shortcomings detected

on some items of equipment.

The site’s organisation in the area of radiation protection

is generally satisfactory. ASN has nevertheless observed

deviations in the monitoring of devices used for radiation

protection checks and in the application of instructions

relative to risk identification and the associated protection

measures.

With regard to emergency situations, ASN notes that the

national emergency exercise carried out on 13thOctober

2015 was satisfactorily managed by the site, particularly

from the technical aspects, even if the quality of external

communication must be improved.

In the area of the environment, EDF provided ASN with

complementary information concerning the operation,

inspectionandmaintenance of the liquideffluent collection

and retention systems; ASN ensured that EDF continued

implementing the planned improvements in this area.

Labour inspection in the nuclear power plants

ASN continued its inspection actions concerning

subcontracting, situations of illegal lending of labour,

the working time of employees of EDF and of certain

subcontractorsandtheconditionsofhealthandsafetyduring

maintenance andconstructionwork. ASN’s oversight action

resulted in the improvement of the working conditions

of the operators on the Paluel 2 reactor condenser repair

worksite in order to meet the applicable requirements.

ASN also examined the circumstances of the fall of the

lifting beam for handling the steam generators on the

Paluel 2 reactor. On this subject, ASNasked that EDF and

the contractor companies involved continue the requisite

analysis and implement appropriate corrective action.

With regard to radiation protection, the inspectors

continued to check implementation of the Everest

initiative on the Flamanville site, an initiative that

significantly changes the conditions of access to controlled

areas and must still undergo operational adaptations.

ASN continued its inspections during work in hot

environments at the beginning of the reactor outage

periods: ASN considers that EDF must confirm the

practical feasibility of the envisaged response actions

should an accident involving a person or person occur

in certain poorly accessible areas.

Construction of the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor

After issue of the authorisation decree and the building

permit, construction work began on the Flamanville 3

reactor in September 2007.

A predominant part of the activities in 2015 concerned

mechanical assemblies, particularly the reactor main

primary system, the electrical installations and the

performance of the first startup tests (see chapter 12,

point 3.3). With regard to civil engineering, the

prestressing of the internal containment of the reactor

building and construction of the external containment

were completed in 2015. ASN carried out a specific

inspection of these operations, and examined worker

radiation protection, protection of the environment

and preparation for reactor operation.

ASN considers that the organisation implemented by

EDF remained satisfactory on the whole.

The work of introducing the principle components of

the main primary system into the reactor building and

then assembling them, which began at the end of 2014,

continued during 2015. This system contains the reactor

core and is thus of primary importance for safety. ASN

examined EDF’s monitoring of the outside contractors

involved in the assembly of the primary system, especially

Areva NP, the systemmanufacturer. ASN considers that

the cleanliness requirements are satisfied on the whole

and that EDF’s management of concomitant activities

conducted near items of equipment is generally adequate.

ASN notes the discovery and subsequent treatment in

2015 of several nonconformities that occurred during

welding of the equipment; ASN considers that EDF

must, in collaboration with the equipment manufacturer,

further the analysis of this issue.

With regard to prestressing of the internal containment

which began in summer 2014, EDF informed ASN of

further difficulties encountered during the tensioning of

a prestressing cable in February 2015. EDF suspended

the activities concerned as a precautionary measure

pending determination of the causes of the deviations

and preparation of a corrective action plan. EDF kept

ASN regularly informed of the deviations observed

during the prestressing activities. ASN adapted its

inspection of this activity accordingly, in particular by

conducting four specific inspections. ASN considers

that EDF responded appropriately to these deviations.

On completion of the inspection of the first startup tests of

the ventilation equipment and the continued tests of the

equipment installed in the pumping station, ASNconsiders

that EDF’s organisational setup for the preparation and

performance of the startup tests can be improved. More

specifically, EDF must be attentive to the rigour with

which deviations encountered during the startup tests

are dealt with in order to decide, among other things,

on the representativeness of the tests performed and

the acceptability of their results, while at the same time

integrating experience feedback for subsequent tests.

ASN will be attentive to ensure proper performance of

the preliminary tests which shall be followed by the

overall tests of the reactor systems.

CAEN DIVISION

235

CHAPTER 08 :

REGIONAL OVERVIEW OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION

ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015