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5.4.3 Management of sources

Themajority of the centres have put in place appropriate

measures for:

recording themovements of sources (93%of the centres);

transmitting the inventory of sources to IRSN each

year (86% of the centres);

managing waste and sources after implanting iodine

seeds, with systematic verification of the remaining

sources (number) with respect to the implanted and

ordered sources (100% of the centres).

Management of the brachytherapy sources is satisfactory;

nevertheless, 85% of the centres inspected in 2014 still

hold expired sealed sources.

5.4.4 Emergency situations and the management

of malfunctions

The majority of the centres have put in place appropriate

measures for:

internal recording of events foreshadowingmalfunctions

or undesirable situations;

an organisation allowing the multidisciplinary analysis

of the causes of internal malfunctions or ESRs;

the implementation of an events management

procedure;

seeking improvement actions for the analysed events.

Only 68% of the centres monitor improvement actions

following an event or a malfunction.

An event involving source jamming of an HDR

afterloader led to the exposure of workers and a female

patient. This event brought home the importance of

defining emergency measures, particularly within

the framework of the on-site emergency plan, and

of reinforcing worker training in these emergency

measures. Instructions on the risk of source jamming

are provided in the brachytherapy units. However,

exercises to prepare for and assess intervention methods

are very rare. Compliance with the requirements

relative to advanced training in worker radiation

protection for the use of high-activity sealed sources

is judged satisfactory (62% of the centres have carried

out this training). This advanced training must focus

in particular on the emergency measures to implement

in the event of possible loss of control of the high-

activity source (example: jamming of a high-activity

source).

With regard to PDR brachytherapy, the centres have

response procedures if an incident arises. However,

these procedures do not detail all the possible scenarios

for identifying the operations to perform, the people

who can perform them and the response time to

optimise worker and patient protection and thus

avoid inappropriate exposures. Actions are therefore

required in this respect.

5.4.5 Summary

ASN considers that the findings of the inspections carried

out in 2013 and 2014 are encouraging. With regard to

the deployment of a quality management system, the

brachytherapy units benefit from the organisation set

up in external-beam radiotherapy for both worker and

patient radiation protection.

Lateness in the deployment of aids specific tobrachytherapy

is nevertheless observed. Efforts must thus be made

regarding compliance with the regulatory requirements

relative to process mapping, training in patient radiation

protection and advanced training in worker radiation

protectionwhenhigh-activity sources are held, the removal

of expired sources, the scheduling and performance of

internal technical controls of radiation protection, the

completeness of the procedure report, the conducting of

the analysis of risks run by patients and the monitoring

of improvement actions following a significant radiation

protection event.

5.5 Radiation protection situation

in nuclear medicine

Over the period from 2012 to 2014, 263 inspections

were carried out in the 225

in vivo

nuclear medicine

units. Comparedwith results established over the 2009-

2011 period, it was observed that the radiation protection

of workers, patients and the environment is taken into

account in an increasingly satisfactory manner.

5.5.1 Radiation protection of nuclear medicine

professionals

The main strong points have been confirmed:

performance of the risk assessment, even if the risk

of external and internal contamination is not always

taken into consideration;

implementation of dosimetric monitoring of the

personnel, appropriate for the modes of exposure,

notably the wearing of dosimetric rings and referring

to the recommendations of ORAMED (Optimization

of Radiation Protection for Medical Staff)

6

;

the writing of a radiation protection control programme

and the performance of external technical controls;

the use of automated systems for preparing the doses

and/or injecting radiopharmaceuticals marked with

fluorine-18.

However, particular efforts must still be made in order

to meet the following regulatory requirements:

the performance of working practices and conditions

analyses for all the professionals involved, taking into

6.

www.oramed-fp7.eu/en/D52Guidelines3_FR_PDF

316

CHAPTER 09:

MEDICAL USES OF IONISING RADIATION

ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015