ASN Report 2015

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material and human resources available, the personnel
training and the emergency exercises held. ASNalso asked
the industrial firms involved in transport operations with
the highest potential consequences to send it their plans
so that they could be analysed in detail.
The public authorities are also preparing for the possibility
of an accident involving the transport of radioactive
substances. On 1st October 2015, ASN thus took part
in an emergency exercise involving the Prefecture and
emergency services, simulating an accident in the Saône-
et-Loire département.
4.2.7 Analysis of incidents
By listing and analysing the various transport incidents,
ASN can identify the problems encountered by the
transport operators and the possible safety risks, in order
to improve current practices and identify any need for
changes to the regulations.
ASN must be notified of any deviation from the
regulations or the safety files applicable to the transport
of radioactive substances; this notification should
conform to the events notification guide, as required
by Article 7 of the Order of 29th May 2009 concerning
the transport of dangerous goods by road (TMDOrder).
This events notification guide was communicated by
letter to the various stakeholders in the transport of
radioactive substances on 24th October 2005 and
can be consulted on . It defines the various
conditions of notification and rating of transport events
on the INES scale. In addition to the notification, a
detailed incident report must be sent to ASN within
two months.
Events declared in 2015
In 2015, ASN was notified of fifty-six level 0 events,
nine level 1 events and one level 2 event in the field of
radioactive substances transport. Graph 3 shows the trend
for the number of events notified since 2000.
Areas of activity concerned by these events
More than half of the events are notified by the
industrial stakeholders in the nuclear cycle (EDF and
Areva in particular). About one fifth of the significant
events concern radioactive pharmaceutical products.
The other events concern transport related to non-
nuclear industrial activities (gamma radiography for
example).
Very few transport-related events are linked to the
non-nuclear industry sectors, when compared with
the corresponding traffic levels. This small number of
events is probably due to small-scale nuclear activity
professionals failing to submit notifications, which can
be explained by unfamiliarity with the events notification
process.
The contents concerned by the event notifications
are extremely varied: radionuclides for medical uses,
contaminated material, fuel, empty packaging, etc.
Graph 4 shows the distribution of notified transport
events according to content and mode of transport.
Level 2 event: non-compliance
with safety prescriptions during transport
of a gamma ray projector
On 16th March 2015, ASN was informed by the ECW
company that a gamma ray projector from the ECW agency
at Courcelles-les-Lens (Pas-de-Calais) had been carried on the
public highway on 2nd March 20155 in breach of a number
of the requirements set out in the transport approval issued by
ASN: the device was not in the closed and locked position and
was equipped with its worksite accessories, which prevented it
from being fully inserted into its transport casing.
Gamma ray projectors are devices used in industrial
radiography to detect defects in materials. They contain
a high-level radioactive source in a shielded compartment,
from which it is only deployed when actually carrying out
radiographic examinations (see diagram in chapter 10,
p. 342). This compartment, which provides radiological
protection, must be secured by a closure system during
transport of the gamma ray projector (closed and locked
position). Given the activity level of their source, gamma ray
projectors must be transported in packages approved by ASN.
The deviations notified to ASN increased the risk of ejection
of the radioactive source from its shielding in the event
of an accident. The consequences of such a scenario could
be significant irradiation of persons in the immediate vicinity
of the site of the accident.
The presence of a collimator on the device and the
measurements taken after transport by the ECW company
indicate that no abnormal beam emerged from the device
during transport. However, as the device was not in the locked
and closed position, this cannot be absolutely guaranteed.
Following notification of this event, ASN carried out two
reactive inspections in the premises of the ECW agency in
Courcelles-les-Lens on 26th March and 14th April. A number
of deviations were noted by the inspectors, indicating a lack of
safety culture within the agency. The ECW company was thus
asked to take corrective measures. The inspection follow-up
letters can be consulted on the ASN website.
Given the potential consequences in terms of public and
worker exposure, ASN rated the transport part of this event
at level 2 on the 8-level (0 to 7) international nuclear and
radiological events scale (INES).
TO BE NOTED
361 CHAPTER 11: TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015