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attention by EDF. Finally, waste management is on

the whole better, but could often be improved, with

deviations from the operational baseline requirements

being observed.

ASN considers that the quality of the documentation

on conventional risks and on the operation of the

installations could be improved, in particular with

regard to the display of certain instructions inside the

installations and the labelling of hazardous substances.

ASN notes that progress has been made in applying and

assimilating the prescriptions regulating discharges set

out in the waste and the detrimental effects prevention

and mitigation provisions of the Order of 7th February

2012 and in resolution 2013-DC-0360 of 16th July 2013.

Finally, ASN considers that EDF’s approach for integrating

the items and activities concerning the control of

detrimental effects and environmental impact, from

among the equipment important for protection of the

interests defined by the Order of 7th February 2012,

is insufficient and must be significantly reinforced.

4.1.6 Analysis of operating experience

The operating experience feedback process

Operating Experience Feedback (OEF) relies mainly

on the process to identify and handle deviations (“OEF

loop”). This process mobilises all the players involved

in reactor operations, including outside contractors.

The steps taken by EDF since 2012, in particular as

part of its “corrective measures programme”, mean that

it is better able to detect deviations from the specified

requirements, with greater involvement in this process

by its contractors and subcontractors. The result is a

significant rise in notifications, requiring adaptation

of the licensee’s organisation. However, in 2015, ASN

noted that the OEF loop is still not effective enough

and considers that improved subsequent assessment

of the remedial, corrective and preventive measures

taken is required.

There are also differences in the way in which the NPPs

take account of operating experience feedback. Some

plants focus on their local OEF while others extensively

integrate the national OEF sent out by the head office

departments.

Greater EDF vigilance in disseminating OEF to its

contractors and subcontractors is also required, because

these latter generally work on several NPPs.

With regard to reactive operating experience feedback – in

other words following a significant event (see chapter  4,

point 3.3) – the NPPs are using a new significant events

analysis method proposed by the EDF head office

departments. ASN notes differences between the sites

in the quality of the significant event reports: the analyses

made by some sites go beyond the apparent causes and

highlight organisational malfunctions, while the analyses

performed on others simply focus on the apparent causes,

despite the presence of “human factors” consultants.

Reactive operating experience feedback, which mainly

comprises an analysis of the often organisational

root causes and the identification, implementation

and follow-up of corrective measures, all too often

remains superficial. A frequent ASN observation is that

the corrective measures adopted by the sites are not

always able to address the organisational malfunctions

highlighted in the analyses.

The deviations leading to significant events are analysed

by the EDF head office departments in order to assess

to what extent they are generic. 2015 was marked by

an increase in the number of generic events. Although

the cause of this increase could be the completion of the

complex characterisation work done on the deviations

behind these events, thepotentially serious nature of certain

generic significant events confirms the importance of the

GRAPH 4:

Trend in the number of significant events rated on the INES scale in EDF nuclear power plants from 2008 to 2015

2013

2014

2015

2009

2008

2012

2011

2010

737

665

72

95

74

95

82

75

66

699

642

680

734

690

629

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

734

795

717

830

817

765

67

1

697

747

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

Total

Level 0

Level 1

Level 2

407

CHAPTER 12:

EDF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (NPPs)

ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015