423 / 536
The liquid effluents are processed and generally recycled.
After verification and in accordance with the discharge
limits, certain radionuclides, such as iodine and tritium,
are sent to the marine outfall pipe. The others are sent to
on-site conditioning units (solid glass or bitumenmatrix).
1.2.2 Operation of the La Hague plants
Examination and follow-up of the periodic
safety review files
In 2008, ASN examined the conclusions of the periodic
safety review for BNI 118, which includes the Effluent
Treatment Station (STE3), the solvent mineralization
facility (MDS/B) and the sea discharge outfall pipe. ASN
is particularly attentive to licensee compliance with the
undertakings made during this periodic safety review.
ASN observed that, on the whole, Areva NC is late in
meeting its initial undertakings, in particular concerning
the performance of conformity examinations on the facility
and the processing of legacy waste.
In 2010, the licensee transmitted the periodic safety
review report for BNI 116 (UP3-A plant). At the request
of ASN, the Institute for Radiation Protection andNuclear
Safety (IRSN) assessed the report submitted by Areva and
presented the results of its assessment to the Advisory
Committee for Laboratories and Plants (GPU) during six
meetings from mid-2012 to March 2015.
•
The first GPUmeeting took place on 27th June 2012. It
examined themethod and the data used by ArevaNC for
the performance of this review, as well as the approach
used to identify the Elements Important for Safety and
how it was applied to BNI 116.
•
The second GPUmeeting was held on 12th June 2013
and examined operating experience feedback, more
specifically concerning the incidents that had occurred.
•
The third GPU meeting took place on 14th January
2014 andwas devoted to reviewing the safety of on-site
transport operations carried out with the Hermes-
Mercure and Navettes package models.
•
The fourth GPU meeting on 26th March 2014 was
devoted to reviewing the conformity of BNI 116with its
baseline safety requirements, the satisfactory control of
the ageing of this facility and the safety of maintenance
operations.
•
The fifthGPUmeeting of 18thMarch 2015was devoted
to the safety reassessment conducted by the licensee, in
particular in the light of changing regulations and best
practices in the field of safety and radiation protection
as well as the lessons learned fromoperating experience
feedback from the facility.
•
The sixthGPUmeeting of 25thMarch 2015was devoted
to the programme of measures defined by the licensee
to improve the safety of its facility, in order to rule on
the level of safety of the UP3-A plant both now and
for the next ten years.
Following this assessment, ASNwill be sendingArevaNC
prescriptions for the safety improvements needed further
to the review. This reviewshowed the need for a significant
improvement in the protection of the installation against
the risk of fire and against the lightning risk. ASN is also
considering requiring greater checks on equipment used
to concentrate the fission products in the facility (the
«evaporators») as this equipment, which concentrates
particularly radioactive substances, is corroding more
rapidly than anticipated at the design stage.
ASNaskedArevaNCto take account of operatingexperience
feedback fromthe examinationof theBNI 116 safety review
file (plant UP3-A) when examining the revieworientation
file for BNI 117 (plant UP2-800) submitted by Areva at
the beginning of January 2016.
Internal authorisation systems
for minor modifications
ASNapproved the implementation of a systemof internal
authorisations forminor operations on the LaHague site in
its 14thDecember 2010 resolution. This systemprovides for
two internal authorisation levels, depending on the extent
of the operations and the associated radiation protection
and safety implications. Before a planned operation or
modification is authorised, it is assessed – depending on
its assigned level –by either a safety specialist independent
of the requesting operatingunit, or, for themost significant
operations, an Internal Authorisations Assessment
Committee (CEDAI). In 2014, ASN received the analysis
of the operating experience feedback about the working
of the internal authorisations system, which Areva was
supposed to have transmitted after it had been in use for
three years. This information is being used to examine
the application for revision of the internal authorisations
system that Areva intends to submit in 2016, to integrate
on the one hand the changes made following the ASN
inspections and the Areva general inspection and, on the
other, the new procedures in particular concerning the
composition of the CEDAI and the criteria for identifying
minor operations.
Spent fuel pool D. Areva spent fuel reprocessing plant at La Hague.
423
CHAPTER 13:
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015