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application of these texts in France and instate ASN
as the competent national Authority. It is therefore
up to ASN to notify the events without delay to the
international institutions and to the Member States, to
supply relevant information quickly in order to limit
the radiological consequences abroad and finally to
provide the Ministers concerned with a copy of the
notifications and information transmitted or received.
2.2.1 Bilateral relations
Maintaining and strengthening bilateral relations with
neighbouring andother European countries is one of ASN’s
major priorities.
In 2015, ASN thus continued regular exchanges with its
European counterparts concerning the harmonisation of
emergency management. Experience feedback from the
Fukushima Daiichi accident and the steps taken since
then in each country, were at the heart of the discussions.
Finally, in 2015, protocols concerning cross-border alert
mechanisms and information exchanges in an emergency
situation were signed with Belgium and Luxembourg.
ASNis continuing todevelopbilateral relations inemergency
management with many countries, Spain, Luxembourg,
Germany, Switzerland andBelgiuminparticular.Meetings
specifically dedicated to emergencymanagement were in
particular held in 2015with these five countries. Chinese
and Japanese delegations visited ASN in 2015 to discuss
emergencysituationsmanagementandtookthisopportunity
to visit the ASN emergency centre. A delegation from the
United States also tookpart in anASNnational emergency
exercise as an observer.
Finally, during the course of 2015, the emergency exercise at
theGravelinesNPPwas able to test cross-border information
exchanges in the event of an accident.
2.2.2 Multilateral relations
The Fukushima Daiichi accident occupied a substantial
amount of time of many of the ASN and IRSN staff, even
though it was a remote accident forwhich the radiological
consequences in France would appear to be limited. In
addition, ASN’s actionswere also limited, because it is not
its responsibility to monitor the actions of the Japanese
licensee.
This accident highlighted the problems that would be
encountered by ASN, IRSN, but also their European
counterparts, inmanaging a large-scale accident inEurope.
Thenuclear safety regulators confirmed theneed formutual
assistance mechanisms and have already undertaken
internationalwork to improve their response organisations.
ASN takes part in IAEA’s work to improve notification
and information exchanges in radiological emergency
situations. It is helping to define international assistance
The HERCA/WENRA approach
During their joint meeting in 2014, the HERCA and WENRA
associations adopted a joint position aiming to improve
cross-border coordination of protection measures during the
first phase of a nuclear accident. The position of HERCA and
WENRA aims, in the event of an accident, to promote the
rapid transmission of information between the countries
concerned and the consistency of the population protection
recommendations issued by the nuclear safety and radiation
protection authorities.
The approach thus recommends the following:
• outside emergency situations, exchanges between
countries to promote Improved mutual familiarity with and
understanding of their emergency organisations;
• in emergency situations
-- if the emergency organisations receive sufficient
information to function normally: during the first hours
of an emergency situation, attempts are made to ensure
alignment of the population protection measures in
neighbouring countries with those decided on by the
country in which the accident occurred;
-- in the event of a highly improbable situation which would
require urgent measures to protect the population but In
which very little information is available, predetermined
«reflex» measures are defined.
In order to implement these principles, a minimum
harmonised level of preparation is necessary. HERCA and
WENRA thus consider that in Europe:
• evacuation should be prepared up to 5 km around nuclear
power plants, and sheltering and ingestion of Iodine Thyroid
Blocking (ITB) tablets up to 20 km;
• a general strategy should be defined in order to be able to
extend evacuation up to 20 km, and sheltering and ingestion
of ITB tablets up to 100 km.
On this basis, the European safety and radiation protection
Authorities have been asked to initiate national level discussions
with the Authorities responsible for civil protection, with a view
to implementing these recommendations. An evaluation of this
approach by the Member States is to be presented to ENSREG
(European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group) in 2016. In
France, work is in progress concerning the organisation of public
protection measures in an emergency situation and their scope
of application. The HERCA-WENRA approach was presented in
this context within a working group comprising in particular the
authorities in charge of civil protection.
TO BE NOTED
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CHAPTER 05:
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY AND POST-ACCIDENT SITUATIONS
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015