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5. OUTLOOK
Cross-disciplinary aspects
ASN will be continuing its review of several of the
Areva Group’s BNIs and will initiate this process on
new facilities at La Hague and Romans-sur-Isère in
particular, but also on EDF’s inter-regional fuel stores
(in Chinon and Bugey).
ASNwill be initiating a newprocess for examining safety
and radiation protectionmanagement in the Areva group
on the basis of the answers to the first review phase
which ended in 2011 and on the basis of the reviews of
the group’s various facilities.
ASNwill continue tomonitor the implementation of the
additional safetymeasures required following the stress
tests, more specifically the Areva proposals concerning
the definition of systems, structures and components
robust to extreme hazards and the management of
emergency situations, in particular compliance with
the new prescriptions issued at the end of 2014 and
in early 2015. In 2016, ASN should in particular be
validating the reference hazards to be considered for
the “hardened safety core” (especially the earthquake
and tornado aspects).
With regard to the Areva group, ASNwill be particularly
vigilant in ensuring that the BNI licensees to be created
as a result of the ongoing split-up of the group, are in
full possession of the capabilities needed to meet their
responsibilities as licensees. In particular, the engineering
capabilities of the two groups resulting from Areva as
it currently stands must be credible enough to make
any changes to the facilities concerned and manage any
emergencies in them.
Fuel cycle consistency
In 2016, ASN will begin to examine the new “Cycle
impact” file, covering the period 2016-2030 and aimed
at anticipating the various emerging needs in order to
manage the nuclear fuel cycle in France. ASN focuses in
particular on monitoring the level of occupancy of the
spent fuel underwater storage facilities (Areva and EDF).
It asked EDF to examine the impact on the anticipated
saturationdates for these storage facilities of the shutdown
of a reactor, of a possible modification in the spent fuel
reprocessing traffic, as well as the solutions envisaged for
delaying these dates. ASNconsiders that the saturation of
the storage facilitiesmust be anticipated (pools at LaHague
and fuel building pools for the EDF reactors) and that
Areva and EDF must very rapidly define a management
strategy going beyond 2030.
ASN will also continue to monitor the files associated
with fuel cycle consistency, notably the creation of a BNI
dedicated to the storage of uraniumfromreprocessing on
the Tricastin site andUP3-A in LaHague for the storage of
compactedwaste packages from spent fuel reprocessing.
Tricastin site
In 2016, ASNwill examine the Atlas BNI commissioning
authorisation application and will continue its review
of the modification of the Socatri facility as part of
the Trident project (see chapter 14). ASN will pay
particular attention to the reorganisation of nuclear
waste management on the site, pending the construction
of the Trident unit.
ASN will continue to monitor the reorganisation
of the Tricastin platform to ensure that these major
organisational changes within the group have no impact
on the safety of the various BNIs on the site. It will also
require that the licensees of the platform assume their
responsibilities so that they complete the unification
process scheduled for 2012 or abandon the pooling
of the equipment which should be at the disposal of
each of them.
Jointly with the ASND and the Ministry for the
Environment, Energy and the Sea (MMEM), ASN will
define the final breakdown into BNIs resulting from
the ongoing process to declassify the INBS on the site.
In this respect, ASNwill register the first BNI resulting
from this process in 2016.
Romans-sur-Isère site
Areva NP still needs to carry out major conformity work
on several buildings.
Given the malfunctions observed in recent years, ASN
will pursue its heightened surveillance of the facility
in 2016 in order to ensure that this licensee’s nuclear
safety performance is improved. It will be attentive to
compliance with the deadlines for performance of the
work defined in the facility’s safety improvement plan
and the revision of its safety baseline requirements. It
will also be attentive to ensuring the implementation
of the improvements planned as part of the stress tests.
The reports presenting the conclusions of the ten-yearly
safety reviews carried out on the two facilities on the site
and submitted in late 2014 for BNI 98 and late 2015
for BNI 63, will be reviewed to enable ASN to reach a
conclusionwith regard to the conditions for authorisation
of possible continued operation of these facilities for the
next ten years.
Mélox plant
Further to the conclusions of the periodic safety review
on the facility and the ASN position statement of July
2014 regarding the continued operation of the Mélox
plant, the licensee is required to implement its action
plans, more specifically with regard to controlling the
criticality risk and radiation protection measures, in
particular in terms of dosimetry. ASN will monitor the
licensee’s compliance with its undertakings and the
ASN prescriptions.
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CHAPTER 13:
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE INSTALLATIONS
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015