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The examination of the applications for changes to
the creation authorisation decree and the water intake
and effluent discharge resolutions has been suspended
pending additional information fromSomanu, for which
ASN observes a significant delay.
The Clean-out and Uranium Recovery Facility (IARU),
situated in Bollène
The activities of BNI 138, operatedby Socatri, a subsidiary
of Areva, can be divided into four sectors:
•
repair and decontamination (dismantling/reassembly,
decontamination, mechanical work, maintenance for
disposal or refurbishment);
•
effluent treatment (in particular that from the Eurodif
plant) via the STEU (treatment of uranium-bearing
effluents for recovery in the formof uranate) and STEF
(final treatment with production of metal hydroxide
sludges) stations;
•
waste treatment and conditioning (sorting, crushing,
compacting, disposal, etc.);
•
storage and transport.
Socatri receives containers of contaminated equipment
and vessel heads on behalf of the EDF Tricastin
Operational Hot Unit (BCOT) (building 852). Socatri
carries out sorting, reconditioning and crushing of waste
from small producers on behalf of the French national
agency for radioactive waste management (Andra).
In 2015, ASN found shortcomings in the control
of operational safety in the activities carried out
by Socatri. Despite reinforced oversight of Socatri’s
commitments further to the periodic safety review of
BNI 138, ASN found in 2015 that the licensee was
having trouble complying with the deadlines and the
content requirements and then implementing them
operationally. These shortcomings in particular concern
the commitments made for controlling the criticality
risk. In 2015, ASN also found several deviations from
the criticality requirements in the operating baseline
requirements in force.
ASN also found that the licensee had not carried out a
sufficiently complete assessment of compliance with
the facility’s baseline safety requirements at the time
of the BNI periodic safety review, more particularly
concerning the EIP. Finally, numerous shortcomings
in the control of the fire risk were observed during
an unannounced inspection on this topic in 2015.
ASN thus requires far greater operational rigour on
the part of Socatri and improved compliance with its
baseline safety requirements.
Examination of the file containing significant changes
to the BNI creation authorisation decree, in particular
concerning the creation of the new Trident waste
processing unit, resumed after Socatri transmitted
new information in July 2015. The regulatory process
will continue in 2016.
Tricastin Operational Hot Unit (BCOT)
BNI 157, operated by EDF, was authorised by Decree
on 29th November 1993. This facility, also situated
in Bollène, is intended for maintenance and storage
of equipment and tools from PWR reactors, except
for fuel elements.
Two old reactor vessel heads were still present in the
facility at the end of 2015, with their removal to Andra
being scheduled for 2016. Finally, ASN is completing
its examination of the facility’s periodic safety review
report, submitted in 2010 and supplemented by EDF
in 2011 and 2013 at the request of ASN. This will lead
in 2016 to monitoring of the removal of radioactive
substances and of the facility’s ability to withstand an
earthquake. The licensee is envisaging final shutdown
of the facility in the next few years and its periodic
safety review contains no plans to reinforce the facility’s
ability to withstand external hazards.
3.4 Inter-regional Fuel Warehouses
(MIR)
EDF has two inter-regional fuel warehouses, on the
Bugey site in the Ain
département
(BNI 102) and at
Chinon in the Indre-et-Loire
département
(BNI 99).
These facilities were respectively authorised by the
Decrees of 2nd March 1978 amended, and 15th June
1978 amended. EDF uses them to store new nuclear
fuel assemblies (only those made of uranium oxide of
natural origin) pending loading into the reactor.
ASN observes improved compliance with the
commitments made following inspections and significant
events. Several physical improvements are thus currently
being implemented. The periodic safety review and stress
tests files were transmitted on time, in March 2015.
However, these files still contain too many gaps and
inconsistencies for them to be examined. ASN therefore
asked EDF to remedy this situation within six months.
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CHAPTER 14:
NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015