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In order to be able to produce exotic nuclei

1

, the Ganil

was authorised in 2012 to build phase 1 of the Spiral 2

project. ASN issued a partial commissioning license

for phase 1 of this project on 30th October 2014. ASN

examined the commissioning application for phase 1

of the Spiral 2 project and notes that the additional

information requested, more specifically concerning

the seismic resistance of the facility, was submitted late,

meaning that it was impossible to conduct a complete

examination in 2015.

ASN has completed the examination of the first

periodic safety review of the installation since it was

commissioned in 1983. This review was on the whole

satisfactory and led ASN to issue several prescriptions

on the conformity of the installation with its safety

baseline requirements and the regulations currently

in force, in order to allow continued operation.

1. The “exotic nuclei” are nuclei which do not exist naturally

on Earth. They are created artificially in the Ganil for nuclear

physics experiments on the origins and structure of matter.

Finally, ASN issued a resolution on 7th July 2015

concerning effluent discharges and transfers at the Ganil.

ASN considers that the licensee must improve how

it organises waste management and in particular its

monitoring of the outside contractor responsible for

packaging the Very Low Level Waste (VLLW) and the

Low-Level Waste (LLW) produced on the site. ASN

also regrets the absence of advance planning for the

removal of the waste stored since 2012.

2.2 The High Flux Reactor (RHF)

at the Laue-Langevin Institute

TheRHF(BNI67)inGrenoble,operatedbytheLaue-Langevin

Institute (ILL), provides neutrons used for experiments in

thefieldsofphysicsandbiology.Thisreactorwasauthorised

by the Decree of 19th June 1969, modified by the Decree

of 5thDecember 1994, andhas amaximumpower of 58.3

MWth,operatingcontinuouslyin50-daycycles.Thereactor

core is cooledbyheavywater contained ina reflective tank,

which is itself immersed in a light water pool.

ASN considers that those aspects of RHF safety identified

by ILL as priorities are managed both proactively and

reactively. In the light of the experience feedback from

the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the ILL thus rapidly

carried out major reinforcement work, which continued

satisfactorily in 2015. However, ASN did find that,

despite these improvements, the expected rigour in the

traceability of the activities and updating of the baseline

safety requirements was not always present. The planning

and quality of the files were not always sufficient. The

post-Fukushima work should continue in 2016 with

the same level of proactive commitment, but withmore

rigour in document transmissions and updates. ASNdoes

however consider that the licensee needs to improve its

organisation in order to comply with the requirements of

the regulations. It must in particular improve and clarify

the facility’s baseline safety requirements and then ensure

that the facility actually complies with these requirements.

The licensee must also make progress in the traceability

andmonitoring of its activities important for protection,

in particular works, maintenance and periodic checks and

tests. In 2015, ASN thus asked the ILL to significantly

improve its monitoring of the regulatory inspections

on electrical and lifting equipment and its lock-out if

the equipment is not up to date with these regulatory

inspections. ASN also requires ILL to analyse and make

greater use of operating experience feedback in order

to improve its own organisation, in particular on the

basis of notified significant events and the observations

and requests expressed by ASN further to inspections.

In 2015, in reply to several requests fromASN, the ILL

proposed implementing an integrated management

system meeting the requirements of the regulations,

along with a reorganisation of its safety system in order

to improve its independence.

Elements of the RHF “hardened safety core”: reinforcement of a door

to withstand extreme flooding.

448

CHAPTER 14:

NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015