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the light of the conclusions of the last periodic safety

review of the installation and its age. Eventual findings on

the operating lifetime of CIS bio international’s current

installations show that it would be prudent to adopt

a final shutdown date at the latest within the next ten

years for the evaluation of the decommissioning costs.

ASN recommends that CIS bio international update

without delay the discounting of its costs mentioned

in Article L. 594-1 of the Environment Code, taking

into account a more realistic operating time.

1.5 Lessons learned from

the Fukushima Daiichi accident

To take into account the lessons learned from the nuclear

accident that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear

power plant in Japan, ASN asked the BNI licensees to carry

out stress tests, including on installations undergoing

decommissioning.

With regard to EDF, at the request of ASN, the stress

test reports for the BNIs undergoing decommissioning

(Chinon A1, A2 and A3, Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux A1

and A2, Bugey 1, Chooz A, Superphénix, Brennilis) and

the Fuel Evacuation Facility (APEC) (Creys-Malville)

were submitted on 15th September 2012. ASN gave its

conclusions on 10th October 2014. It considered that

the procedure followed complied with the specifications

and asked for further information relative to the seismic

risk in the APEC and the gas-cooled reactors, and the

flood risk in the gas-cooled reactors. EDF has already

committed itself to taking several of these demands

into account.

With regard to the CEA installations, the Plutonium

Technology Facility (ATPu) (Cadarache) currently

undergoing decommissioning was the subject of

resolution No. 296 of 26th June 2012 setting out

additional requirements in the light of the conclusions of

the stress tests. In addition to the generic requirements,

ASN askedCEA to keep up to date the estimated quantities

of fissile materials present in each area within the

ATPu. ASN did not however consider it necessary to

set “hardened safety core” requirements for this BNI.

ASN resolution of 26th June 2012, issued subsequent to

the transmission on 15th September 2011 of the stress

tests report for the Phénix reactor (Marcoule), sets out

additional requirements to reinforce the robustness of

the installation against extreme situations, notably by

establishing a “hardened safety core”. The ASN resolution

of 8th January 2015 also sets additional prescriptions

specifying the requirements applicable to the “hardened

safety core” of the Phénix reactor and the management

of emergency situations.

ASN has not issued prescriptions for the Rapsodie

reactor (Cadarache), for which the report was issued

on 13th September 2012. Nevertheless, CEA has

undertaken to review the scenario of a sodium-water

reaction induced by rainfall occurring further to an

extreme earthquake having caused severe structural

failure of the BNI buildings. The corresponding study

was submitted at the end of 2014 at the request of ASN.

The report concerning the Irradiated Materials Facility

(AMI) operated by EDF at Chinon was submitted on

6th June 2014. ASN considered on 10th July 2015 that the

measures adopted by EDF to mitigate the consequences

of an accident situation associated with extreme external

hazards, such as those taken into consideration for the

stress tests, were satisfactory, subject to removal in the

short term of the radiological inventory present in the

installation.

The experience feedback from the Fukushima Daiichi

accident will be taken into account for the facilities

of lesser importance later on, notably during the next

periodic safety reviews for the Procédé and Support

BNIs (Fontenay-aux-Roses).

The installations whose decommissioning work is

sufficiently far advanced, or whose potential source

term is very low and for which delicensing is very close,

are not concerned by the stress tests.

1.6 The international action of ASN

in the area of decommissioning

ASNparticipated in various international actions relating

to decommissioning in 2015.

It contributed in particular to the WENRA “Waste and

decommissioning” working group which in June 2013

published a report identifying the reference safety

levels applicable to the decommissioning of nuclear

installations. These reference safety levels must be

transposed into the national regulations of each of the

WENRA member countries. Publication of the Order

of 7th February 2012 allowed a number of these safety

levels to be transposed, relating to safety management in

particular, but other measures still have to be specified

in ASN resolutions, notably the resolutions relative to

the studies of waste management in the installations

and to decommissioning, currently under preparation.

ASNisalsoamemberoftheInternationalDecommissioning

Network (IDN) coordinated by the IAEA and as such

keeps itself informed of the international projects. It

has contributed in particular since 2012 to the CIDER

(Constraints to Implementing Decommissioning and

Environmental Remediation) Project, which aims to

identify and develop aids to overcome the difficulties that

member countries can encounter in site decommissioning

and rehabilitation projects.

463

CHAPTER 15:

SAFE DECOMMISSIONING OF BASIC NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015