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ASN considers that the BNIs are operated in conditions of
safety that are on thewhole satisfactory. CEAmust however
remain vigilant to compliancewith the operations baseline
requirements for the facilities andwith the regulatory texts.
A number of deviations from the baseline requirements
have been detected by inspections or were notified by
CEA as significant events.
For the Saclay site, CEA released its stress tests report
on 30th June 2013. The review of this report continued
through to 2015 and ASN prescribed the requirements
associatedwith the equipment andmeasures constituting
the centre’s “hardened safety core” on 12th January 2016.
ASNobservedprogressinthemanagementofwastestorage,
in particular in BNI 35, with the definition of operating
instructions. Improvements are however still needed for
BNI 101, with regard to the management of facility waste
zoningand the issueof formal operating instructions for the
storage areas. BNI 49 must also be vigilant with regard to
managing the traffic andstorageof decommissioningwaste,
whichgave rise to thenotificationof two significant events.
The organisation for the management of the centre’s
on-site and off-site transport operations appeared to be
satisfactory, apart from management of deviations, for
which analysis and follow-up need to be strengthened.
The ASN inspections carried out in 2015 also revealed
a number of deviations concerning the application
of regulatory procedures for the management of BNI
modifications. ASN calls on the licensee to conduct a
review of its organisation and define an improvement
action plan to prevent these deviations from reoccurring.
CEA again notified events concerning the monitoring
of gaseous discharges from the facilities. One event in
particular revealed that the steps taken by CEA to ensure
compliance with the resolutions regulating the discharges
from the centre were not exhaustive andwere not carried
out with the necessary rigour.
Finally, ASN is particularly critical of how the replacement
of very high level sources is managed in BNI 77, which
led to several weeks of incorrect storage in the centre’s
installations, a fact that was only notified belatedly. At
ASN’s request, CEA examined the internal causes of this
situation and this lack of transparency.
Marcoule centre
The Marcoule centre is the CEA centre for the back-end
nuclear fuel cycle and in particular for radioactive waste.
It plays a major role in the research being conducted
pursuant to the Programme Act of 28th June 2006 on
the sustainablemanagement of radioactivematerials and
waste. Defence nuclear facilities are installed on it, along
with three CEA BNIs – Atalante, Phenix (see chapter 15)
andDiadem– for whichASN issued a favourable creation
authorisation opinion on 12th November 2015 (see
chapter 16).
The site also comprises three other BNIs, not operated by
CEA: theGammatec irradiator,Melox (see chapter 13) and
Centraco (see chapter 16).
In2015,asinpreviousyears,ASNconsideredthatthesafety
managementoftheBNIsintheMarcoulecentreoperatedby
CEAwas on thewhole satisfactory. The inspections carried
outonthecentre’smanagementandonthecivilBNIsrevealed
no significant deviation.
Fontenay-aux-Roses centre
ThetwoBNIsinthiscentrearecurrentlybeingdecommissioned
(see chapter 15).
Grenoble centre
The CEA BNIs in this centre are currently being
decommissioned (see chapter 15).
1.2.2 Research reactors
Thepurposeof experimental nuclear reactors is tocontribute
to scientific and technological research and to support
operation of the nuclear power plants. Each reactor is a
special case for which ASN has to adapt its monitoring
while ensuring that safety practices and rules are applied
and implemented. In this respect, the last few years have
seen the development of a more generic approach to the
safety of these facilities, inspired by the rules applicable
to power reactors. This approach in particular concerns
the safety assessment based on “operating conditions”
(postulated initiating events) and the safety classificationof
the associated equipment. It has led to significant progress
in terms of safety. This approach is alsoused for theperiodic
safety reviews of the facilities as well as for the design of
new reactors.
Critical mock-ups
Masurca reactor (Cadarache)
The Masurca reactor (BNI 39), whose creation was
authorised by a Decree dated 14th December 1966, is
intended for neutron studies – chiefly on the cores of
fast neutron reactors – and the development of neutron
measurement techniques. This installation has been shut
down since 2007 for compliancework, inparticular with
regard to seismic resistance. The reactor core has been
completely unloaded and the fuel has been stored since
then in the fissilematerials Storage andHandling Building
(BSM). The stress tests performed, more specifically in
the seismic field, confirmed the need to build a newBSM
and, in themeantime, to transfer the fissilematerial to the
Magenta facility (BNI 169), which is built to earthquake
design standards.
Although removal of the fissilematerialswas completed in
October 2014, the renovation project (modernisation of
the existing buildings and constructionof the newstorage
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CHAPTER 14:
NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015