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ASN considers that the level of safety of the facility
is satisfactory. Follow-up of the commitments made
following inspections and significant events is in
particular of high quality. However, ASN is waiting for
clarification of the response if the radiation protection
monitors are triggered and in the event of an alert on
the gaseous discharge vent.
This facility also accommodates a shielded cell
(Célimène, building 619) which has not been used
since 1993. For the time being, CEA envisages that
its decommissioning will be completed in 2024. The
examination of the periodic safety review, which began
in December, was on the whole satisfactory and gave
rise to an improvement action plan that CEA has
undertaken to implement. In 2016, ASN will prescribe
some of these improvements considered to be the
most important, in particular the demonstration of the
seismic design of the facility and the decommissioning
of the Célimène unit.
Research and development laboratories
Alpha facility and Laboratory for Transuranian Elements Analysis
and Reprocessing Studies (Atalante) (Marcoule)
The main purpose of the Atalante facility (BNI 148),
created in the 1980s, is to conduct research and
development on the recycling of nuclear fuels, the
management of ultimate waste and the exploration of
new concepts for fourth generation nuclear systems.
In 2015, the safety level in Atalante was on the whole
stable by comparison with the previous years. Given
the variety and numerous changes in the activities
carried out in the facility, this level of safety is based on
operation conforming to the baseline requirements. In
2016, the start-up of new processes and the transfer of
R&D activities from Cadarache will be decisive factors
in the safety of the facility and ASN will be vigilant in
ensuring that account is taken of organisational and
human factors, the organisation and management of
safety and the hardware modifications made to the
facility.
Following three significant events in 2014 and 2015
concerning the electrical power supply and I&C, in
particular Elements Important for Protection (EIP), ASN
carried out reinforced investigations in 2015. It will be
maintaining particular vigilance during the inspections
scheduled for 2016 as well as during the examination of
the next periodic safety review. The licensee sent ASN
the file presenting the orientation of the forthcoming
safety review in April 2015. ASN issued its opinion,
stressing the importance of the conformity of Activities
Important for Protection (AIP) and of the EIP in the
facility with their requirements defined by CEA, and
the regulation review deadlines.
1.2.4 Fissile material stores
The Central Fissile Material Warehouse (MCMF) (Cadarache)
Built in the 1960s, the MCMF (BNI 53) is a storage
warehouse for enriched uranium and plutonium. Its
main duties are reception, storage and shipment of non-
irradiated fissilematerials pending reprocessing, whether
intended for use in the fuel cycle or temporarily without
any specific purpose surplus to requirements.
Given the inadequate seismic design of the facility, ASN
asked CEA to remove the nuclear materials stored in
it before 31st December 2017, the date on which the
facility will be finally shut down. The commissioning
of the Magenta facility meant that removal of materials
fromMCMF could continue. The removal from storage
operations continued in 2015, within a time-frame
compatible with the ASN request.
In 2015, the licensee transmitted the orientations file
for the safety review scheduled for 2017. In the next
few years, CEA must submit the decommissioning file
for the facility.
The Magenta facility (Cadarache)
The Magenta facility (BNI 169), which replaces the
MCMF, is dedicated to the storage of non-irradiated fissile
material and the non-destructive characterisation of the
nuclear materials received. Its creationwas authorised in
2008 and its commissioning on 27th January 2011. The
increase in activity in the facility, owing to the transfer of
storage from Masurca, the MCMF, and ÉOLE-Minerve
to Magenta, is taking place with a satisfactory level of
safety, with the organisation of operations being efficient
in the light of the current risks.
The activities authorised in Magenta restrict the risks
to the storage of materials, as CEA has not transmitted
authorisation applications for commissioning of glove
boxes. In this respect, ASN notes that the transmission
of safety baseline requirements conforming to the actual
condition of the facility is behind schedule.
1.2.5 The Poseidon irradiator
The Poseidon facility (BNI 77) at Saclay, created by the
Decree of 7th August 1972, is an irradiator consisting
of a cobalt-60 source storage pool, partially topped
by an irradiation bunker. The facility also features a
submersible chamber and a test cell. R&D into the
behaviour of materials under radiation is carried out
in Poséidon. The main risk in the facility is that of
exposure to ionising radiation owing to the presence
of very high level sealed sources.
The safety of the facility is considered to be satisfactory,
the operating conditions are correct and the follow-up
of the periodic inspections and tests is appropriate. The
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CHAPTER 14:
NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015