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bunkers dohowever showsigns of cracking, which requires
very strict monitoring.
Examination of the periodic safety review, for which the
complete file was transmitted in June 2013, and of the
stress tests, is continuing. In 2016, ASNwill specify the
preconditions for continued operation.
1.2.6 Waste and effluent storage and
treatment facilities
The CEAwaste and effluent storage and treatment facilities
are addressed in chapter 16.
1.2.7 Installations undergoing decommissioning
The CEA facilities undergoing decommissioning, as well
as the CEA decommissioning strategy, are covered in
chapter 15.
1.3 Planned facilities
The purpose of the ASTRID project (Advanced Sodium
Technological Reactor for Industrial Demonstration),
currently at the design phase, is to produce a
technological demonstrator for which the technical
options can be extrapolated to a possible Generation IV
electricity generating reactor by about 2050. This
project is supported by CEA, in association with EDF
and Areva. Astrid is a Sodium-Cooled fast neutron
Reactor (SCR), one of the six identified Generation IV
reactor series. The first orientations envisaged for the
design of Astrid were presented in a Safety Guidelines
Document (DOrS) which was submitted to ASN in
2012 in advance of the regulatory procedures. This
DOrS precedes the optional transmission of a Safety
Options File (DOS) which was not transmitted before
the end of 2015, as had been initially planned by CEA.
This DOrS is also well upstream of the BNI creation
authorisation application procedure. Concerning this
DOrS, in a letter dated 10th April 2014, ASN informed
CEA of the demonstrations that would need to be
provided in the next stage of the procedure, so that
it could issue a position statement on the safety of
the Astrid project. For ASN, this reactor must offer a
level of safety at least equivalent to that of the third
generation reactors (the EPR in France), incorporate the
improvements resulting from the lessons learned from
the Fukushima Daiichi accident and, as a prototype of
a fourth generation plant series designed to provide
significant safety gains, enable reinforced safety options
to be prepared and tested.
1.4 ASN’s general assessment
of CEA actions
The results of 2015 and ASN’s assessment of each facility
are detailed per region in chapter 8, in chapter 15 for
the facilities being decommissioned and in chapter 16
for the waste processing and storage facilities.
2015 was marked by CEA being required to implement
post-Fukushima “hardened safety cores” in some of
its centres and facilities. This implementation will
significantly improve safety and enable CEA to acquire
robust diagnosis and emergency management resources.
ASNunderlined that the performance of these numerous
reviews associated with the preparation of the final
shutdown anddecommissioning authorisation application
files represents a major safety issue, which will require
significant resources on the part of CEA. CEA’s compliance
with the deadlines set for its “major commitments” has
improved. It also agreed to give fresh impetus to this
approach in order to share themain nuclear safety issues
to be dealt with over the coming decade.
ASN will also be vigilant with regard to the actual
initiation of the decommissioning operations on the
facilities finally shut down, in accordance with French
regulations (see chapter 15) and the updating of CEA’s
decommissioning, post-operational clean-out and waste
management strategy.
ASN considers that the level of safety in the facilities
operated by CEA is on the whole satisfactory, in
particular the operation of its experimental reactors.
ASN considers that CEA must reinforce its surveillance
and its oversight of external contractors in a context
of large-scale subcontracting.
2. NON-CEA NUCLEAR RESEARCH
INSTALLATIONS
2.1 Large National Heavy Ion
Accelerator
The Ganil (National Large Heavy Ion Accelerator)
economic interest group, was authorised by the Decree
of 29th December 1980 to create an accelerator in Caen
(BNI 113). This research facility produces, accelerates
and distributes ion beams with various energy levels
to study the structure of the atom. The intense, high-
energy beams produce strong fields of ionising radiation,
activating the materials in contact, which then emit
radiation even after the beams have stopped. Irradiation
thus constitutes the main risk at the Ganil.
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CHAPTER 14:
NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2015